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Dr P 0 Williams asked how Professor Wolff would place pediatrics in priority, in this country and in the developing countries, in relation to other fields.
Professor Wolff replied that pwdiatrics was general medicine concerned with a particular age-group, i.e. from conception to the attainment of adulthood. In this country it accounted for one quarter of the total population. It seemed right to give high priority to the medical care of this age-group for many reasons, including the fact that individuals who had received good medical care throughout childhood were more likely to grow up into healthy adults. Thus good child care had an important bearing on the future health and prosperity of the country.
In the developing countries children accounted for an even larger proportion of the population, in some areas for as much as half. Therefore pwdiatrics in the developing countries should have an even higher priority.
It was sometimes suggested that in the developing countries family planning should have a higher priority than child care. Most paediatricians were of the opinion that the two must proceed in parallel, because parents were unlikely to use birth control measures as long as mortality rates were so high that only half the children born could be expected to survive beyond the 5th year oflife. Dr T B Binns (Horsham) said that there seemed to have been a tendency to equate maximal and optimal in respect of child growth, and he would have reservations about this at the earlier end of the pmdiatric spectrum. He had even greater reservations about the later end, when physical maturity appeared increasingly to outgrow psychological maturity.
Professor Wolff said that he was in agreement with Dr Binns. In animals the early onset of puberty was found to be associated with a shorter life-span. Eid (1970, Brit. med. J. ii, 74) had shown that rapid weight gain during the early weeks of life was associated with a higher incidence of obesity during the later years of childhood. Further, it was now recognized that childhood obesity was likely to persist into adult life and that obesity in the adult carried increased morbidity and mortality. There was also the possibility that an excessive milk intake during the early years of life might play a part in the complex etiology of atherosclerosis. Overnutrition had undoubted dangers and presented a real problem to pediatricians of the developed countries. In the world as a whole, however, undemutrition still presented the greater problem and caused the death of many children.
World Population Trends and Controls
by Professor D V Glass FBA (Department ofSociology, London School ofEconomics, London WC2) World population growth is so widely discussed nowadays, and the indices of growth so frequently cited, that no more than a brief indication of the general situation need be given here.
For the world as a whole, the rate of population increase is now around 2 % per year, implying a doubling of the population in 35 years if circumstances remain unchanged. In absolute terms, the world total of about 3,300 millions today would rise to over 6,000 millions by the beginning of the next century. Far more important, however, than the total figures are the figures and prospects for the different regions, especially for the less developed as compared with the more developed countries, and both the rates of increase and the relative weight ofthe factors associated with population growth differ markedly as between those two groups of countries.
Today, the more developed countries, with a total population of some 1,000 millions, are growing in numbers by about 1 % annually. At that rate, a population would double in 70 years. Mortality is now very low; for the group of countries concerned, the expectation of life at birth is just over 70 years. Though death rates can be expected to fall, futher reductions will havevery little effect upon the long-term rate of population increase, for that rate is influenced only by mortality up to the end of the childbearing period, and the probability of survival to that age is now extremely high. In England and Wales, for example, taking the death rates in 1964-6, 95 out of 100 new-born girls would survive until their 45th birthdays. Nor will reductions in mortality have much effect upon age structure, which is influenced primarily by the level and trend of fertility.
Fertility still varies considerably within the developed world. Today, it is probably lowest in some of the Central and Eastern European countriesin Czechoslovakia and Hungary in particularand highest in Albania and Portugal. It is also relatively high in North America and Australia. After World War II, fertility ceased to fall in many ofthe Western countriesgenerally those with the lowest levels before the warand in some cases it rose. Changes in marriage habits played an important part in many countries, especially in Britain, where they accounted for over 30 % of the rise in fertility. But fertility has begun to fall again in recent years in many of the countries in which it had earlier appeared to stabilize. And birth pre-vention is now very widespread in most of the developed societiesprimarily through contraception in the West, but far more through abortion in Eastern and Southern Europe. Indeed, the role of abortion has been so powerful in Eastern Europe, that two countries -Romania and Bulgariahave changed their formerly permissive legislation and have initiated pro-natalist policiessimilar to, though far less extensive than, those in France.
Population growth in the developed world is now giving rise to some concern and has been linked to the expanding debate on the 'environment' and on pollution. This is understandable and, of course, in the long run any continuing positive rate of population increase, however small, would lead to enormous numbers. But in the short run -in the next thirty years, for example there is very little reason to fear that prospective increases in numbers in the developed world would lower levels of living. And so far as environmental deterioration is concerned, many factors other than population growth are involved, factors which might well be far easier to control than fertility.
In the Third Worldthe less developed regions, with almost 2,300 million inhabitantsthe picture is very different. Current rates of population increase are around 2-4 % per yearimplying, if such rates continue, a doubling of numbers in 30 years. And the rates of increase are often considerably higheraround 3 % in tropical South America, 2-6 % in Africa and 2-8 % in South Asia. Although mortality has fallen markedly in much of the third world since the 1940s, the expectation of life at birth in the less developed regions as a whole has probablystill not quite reached 50years. Thus further reductions in mortality would produce ahigher rate ofpopulation increase, especially in Africa and South Asia. It may be that earlier assessments of the prospects of reducing mortality in the third world were somewhat too optimistic. Malaria eradication, for example, has met unexpected difficulties, both from the insect vector and from human beings. But nutrition and health services are important factors in mortality control, and if these improve, death rates will continue to fall. The other component of natural increasefertilityhas so far shown little change save in a few, exceptional societies. And even if fertility were to fall sharply in the near future, this would not prevent very substantial further population growth in the next thirty years, for growth in the short term is heavily influenced by the present age structure of the population. In the Third World today, almost 42% of the population is under 15 years of age, and when that age group passes into the reproductive years it will produce many births, even if average family size is reduced. (In the de-veloped world, by contrast, the proportion under 15 years of age is only 28 %.)
That is not an argument against large-scale birth control programmes. The longer-term prospects, mainly determined by levels of fertility, will be affected by what is done to control fertility now and in the near future. And even in the short run, effective birth control programmes would have one most important resultthe age structure would change markedly. This itself would help to ease the problems of developing countries, whose task of modernization is made more difficult because so large a proportion of resources has to be spent on young dependants, without any immediate return. Nevertheless it is important to stress the fact thatshort of catastrophethe populations of the less developed countries are bound to increase, and realistic planning for economic and social development must take that increase into account. With effective birth control programmes and a substantial fall in family size over the next ten or twenty years, the rate of population growth would gradually fall. The hope is that it would fall to a level at which the continuing increase in numbers as such would cease to be a serious obstacle to the improvement of levels of living. How realistic is that hope and how quickly is fertility likely to fall ?
It is clearly unfortunate that birth control policies and programmes were not implemented earlier, before the current rates of growth had been reached. Yet it would be unrealistic to have expected a much earlier start, given the various difficulties involved. One difficulty was that of recognizing-emotionally as well as intellectuallythe disadvantages of a continuing increase in numbers. It is easy to agree that death rates should be reduced. But a policy of reducing birth rates may appear at first sight to be one of national or racial suicide and this appearance is reinforced when pressures for such a policy come primarily from the affluent West. It was necessary for the developing societies themselves to appreciate the importance of the demographic factor and even so there were sometimes attacks from their own people on policies which were regarded as aiming at genocide. Futher, there were in the West itself conflicts which restricted the help available for those poorer countries which wanted to embark upon birth control programmes. Soviet and Roman Catholic ideology combined to prevent the WHO and the UN from being involved. Circumstances have changed in recent yearsat least in the sense that the international agencies are now heavily engaged in giving assistance. Catholic ideology remains a problem so far as means of control are concerned, but the debate generated by the recent Papal Encyclical is likely to diminish rather than to reinforce individual conformity to the official doctrine. Many countries now have governmental birth control programmesin contrast to the situation in most industrial societies, where birth control facilities are far more the result of private or voluntary initiative. Taking the Third World as a whole, the countries with birth control policies now comprise some twothirds of the total population of the region, while governmental support to private initiative is given in countries with about another 10% -of the total population. Much of this change is very recentpredominantly during the past five or six years. And this itself means that in general birth control programmes are still by no means fully formulated or widespread in their coverage. In such cases, significant results could scarcely be expected in the immediate future. But there are other difficulties which apply to the older as well as to the newer programmes.
During their period of industrialization, the position of Western societies was, from the point of view of population growth and its consequences, much more favourable than that of most developing societies today. Mortality was declining more slowly, and very largely without the help of medicine. It was in the main economic development as such which, by raising levels of living, cut the death rates. And economic development itself, by providing much wider opportunities, raised aspirations so that by the time medicine was able to contribute significantly to mortality control, competing pressures were persuading couples to restrict their family size. In addition, many Western societies already had some pre-industrial built-in population control in the form of restraints on marriage. Beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for reasons which we do not yet understand, marriage patterns changed from their previous 'natural' model, with early age at marriage and almost universal marriage, to an 'artificial' model with a much higher age at marriage and substantially less than universal marriage. In England this pattern prevailed until after World War II. But developing societies had no such built-in control. In addition, much of the reduction in mortality in those societies has not been achieved by economic development but by public health action which by itself did little to provide opportunities, or to inject new aspirations, or to modify reproductive behaviour.
In industrialized societies the shift from high to low fertility was achieved very largely without the aid of modern forms of contraception. Motivation, the resultant of competing pressures, was sufficiently powerful to produce socially highly effective results from crude techniquesprimarily from coitus interruptus. That kind ofmotivational pressure is not yet widespread in developing societies; we could hardly expect it to be, given the often abysmally low levels of living. True, various attitude studies have shown that, throughout the developing world, many married couples are in favour of limiting fertility. But favourable attitudes do necessarily produce systematic attempts to practice family limitation. Of course, the birth prevention techniques now widely available are much more effective than the crude form of control used in the West in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and we are in effect trying to substitute modern techniques for motivation. But none of the newer techniques is ideal and not infrequently their usefulness is lowered in practice because of 'overselling'. This happened, for example, with the intrauterine device which, in some countries, was initially regarded as the 'perfect solution' and was applied without sufficient care and without giving sufficient information to the recipients. The result was a negative feedback which, for a time, jeopardized the programme.
Given the circumstances in most developing societies, it is not surprising that it is only exceptional countries which so far have shown sizeable reductions in fertility. These countries are Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Puerto Rico, HongKong and also apparently Mauritius in very recent years. These are all small countries in which it is relatively easy to organize an efficient birth control programme. In several cases, too, birth control programmes reinforced already visible, spontaneous declines in fertility, so that the programmes may have helped to speed up the rate of decline but were not responsible for initiating the trend. In addition, and certainly not least important, most of the countries are relatively high up on the ladder of development, with heavy capital investment, widespread literacy, substantial educational systems and extensive medical and public health services. No single type of birth prevention has been equally relevant in all these societies. In some, the IUD has been very important. But in Puerto Rico the main device has been female sterilization, a method which has had little appealor little applicationin most societies.
In the large land masses, which contain the bulk of the population of the third world, the rate of change has been less encouraging. For many countriesin Africa, for examplethis is not surprising since the programmes are both very new and still on a rather small scale. But in countries like India and Pakistan, where the programmes are older and more widespread, there have clearly been deficiencies in organization at the central and still more at the local level. Probably too much has been attempted with the resources available, and the services are thus spread thin and have had less impact than if there had been greater concentration in the initial stages. And there has not been effective evaluation in these countries, so that it is difficult to learn from experience or to assess the actual impact of the programmes. Nevertheless the results are not discouraging, having regard to the difficulties involved. In India, for example, large numbers have been reached by male sterilization and by IUDs, even though these are still only a small proportion of the relevant couples (probably around 6 million sterilizations and 3 million IUD insertions in India). And in mainland China, to judge from available accounts of the nature of the programme, the results may well have been much greater, though there are no published statistics on the trend of marriage or of fertility. Clearly there is much to be done. But at least most developing societies now have a framework in which action can be organized and this itself is a remarkable innovation.
As for the future, action is required along several lines. First, substantial advance in the technology of birth prevention is requiredincluding in the term 'prevention' improved techniques for inducing abortion. Action along this line is especially needed because it is almost inevitable during the next twenty to thirty years that, in many societies, efficient techniques will have to continue to act as a partial substitute for effective motivation. Secondly, much needs to be doneand can be doneto improve the organization of existing programmes and the utilization of existing techniques. Thirdly, economic development as such needs to be much more rapid than has so far been the case. This is essential both to ensure that the almost inevitable further population increase can be absorbed and to provide the basis for changes in aspirations and behaviour. Fourthly, on the negative side, we should try to counteract the 'population crisis' hysteria which some Western writers have been generating, and which is offensive and unrealistic. Offensive, because we in the affluent West do not really know whywe succeeded in controlling our fertility, yet we are in a sense condemning the populations offar poorer societies for not knowing how to control their fertility. Unrealistic on at least two counts: first, because we expect undernourished and illiterate populations to behave with a rationality which we did not begin to show until we had achieved much higher levels of living; and secondly, because hysteria is an extremely poor basis for constructive planning or action. 
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DISCUSSION
Dr G E W Wolstenholme said that a few years ago he had been told by some Chinese authorities that they saw no hope of making progress economically unless they could reduce the population increase to not more than 1 % per year by the end of the century. By contrast, in France, a few years ago, President de Gaulle said that he would not be satisfied until there were at least a hundred million French people. The national motivation in these two cases was very different. Since world agencies had great difficulty in getting involved at all, would Professor Glass feel that the time had come when there should be a separate world agency which would have the duty of putting to countries the desirability, for economic and other reasons, of controlling their populations ?
Professor Glass replied that he would not be in favour ofhaving a separate world agency. He thought it would add to the hysteria and the 'climbing on the band wagon' which was already taking place. Since population growth itself was so much a function of a whole variety of social and economic factors, he did not think that the problem could be dealt with satisfactorily by setting up a separate agency. To do so would be a form of arrogance and would implicitly assume that we knew far more about how to deal with these populations than was the case.
As to the contrast between China and France, he was afraid that no world agency would be able to deal with France. It was not a matter of economics, it was a matter of national pride. But French population policy, which had been pro-natalist for a good many years, had not been particularly successful. Other western countries, without such policies, had also shown increases in fertility since World War II.
A member wished to contest the view that people who were 'hysterical' about this (he would deny that one was necessarily hysterical if one was worried) were offensive and unrealistic. He did not think people in this country were pointing to the third world and saying 'This is terrible, you must do something about it'; surely it was felt that, with a population increase of (he believed) only about 05 %, something should be done about it here at home; he contended that Britain was grossly overpopulated. This was one of the principal tenets of Dr Fraser Darling's Reith Lectures, and it would be interesting to hear his comments on this particular aspect ofPliofessor Glass's paper.
Professor Glass said that he was not talking about what individuals were saying about their own societies. Indeed, he himself had collaborated in producing a sup-plement to Population Studies (May 1970) entitled 'Toward a population policy for the United Kingdom'. It was not a dogmatic kind of document, but it tried to emphasize the importance of taking demographic factors into account.
What he was concerned with was a rather different kind of behaviour. For example, it was not uncommon to hear suggestions that international assistance should not be given to developing countries unless they would guarantee to reduce their birth rate. Such a demand would be fantastic. He was particularly hostile to the kind of book which had given rise to so much debate and was forming the basis of 'teach-ins' in the universities in the United States.
One such book, 'The Population Bomb' by Paul Ehrlich, contained an introduction which he found totally unconvincing. In this Dr Ehrlich said he had long been intellectually convinced of the relevance of the demographic factor, but had become convinced emotionally when he and his wife had been in a flearidden taxi among pullulating hordes in Delhi. They were frightened; would they get back to their hotel? Professor Glass had been in Old Delhi scores of times and he felt safer and happier and more comfortable there than in some large Western cities. If someone could write to this effect about Old Delhi, he was not inclined to accept what he said in the rest of the book.
Dr F Fraser Darling said he was very glad to hear Dr Glass take this hard-headed view about world population. It was here with us and he did not see any possibility of there being any major fall in the world-wide birth rate for a considerable time. He, too, deplored the rather hysterical attitude of Paul Ehrlich and yet, when one met and talked to him, he was very different. He could not imagine why anyone should be frightened in any way in walking about Old Delhi. What he was conscious of was that it was very much safer to walk around the crowded island of Hong Kong, where there was a lot of wickedness, than in Washington. In this spacious planned city, one took a taxi from A to B in the evening.
What really frightened him about the population problem was the enlarging number ofnot mouthsbut flat feet. We could do great damage with our upright posture. He had seen villages in India only three years old. There was nobody there before and yet these places were packed down hard; one felt they had been there since the beginning of time. Any nation must be concerned for the state of its environment and those who were enlarging so vastly in numbers particularly so. In our own country we were still too prodigal of space; space was needed for various things. All our mode of life was for using more space, and we were in no less danger than India. The more we in the West saw of India the more patience we should get to try to appreciate the problem which India was up against, with much less ability to deal with it than we had ourselves. He did not think we were as bothered about the 1%Y per annum increase in our own population as we should be. There was no such thing as a compulsory cutting down of the birth rate, the urge towards it had to come from within. Any tendency to lessen the birth rate must come, finally, from inner conviction, and this had not yet occurred. Dr John W Todd (Farnham) commented that the population of the highlands of Scotland was steadily decreasing; the island of Skye had had a population of 25,000 in 1800 and it was 5,000 now. Ireland had had a population of 8 million in 1840 and it was 4 million now. In Wales the counties of Merioneth, Montgomery and Radnor had falling populations. It was widely thought by many people in this country that an ideal place to go was to Guernsey; yet Guernsey's population density was three times that of Great Britain.
Dr D A Andersen (Institute of Urology, London) said that according to Professor Glass the birth rate in some developed countries had fallen before the techniques of modern birth control were known and this fall was, therefore, probably due to adequate motivation. This appeared to follow a rise in the standard of living which caused parents to limit the size of families voluntarily, so that the children could be well cared for and educated. If a rise in economic level acted as an effective check on population, what degree of rise was needed in undeveloped countries before this check would come into effect? Could it follow a modest rise or only when the economic level rose considerably?
Professor Glass said he could not answer that question; different western countries had reacted at different levels of living. Ireland's reaction to the beginning of a change in the whole population situation took place in circumstances of almost unparalleled poverty immediately following one of the worst famines that country had ever seenor that Europe had ever seen, for that matter. The reaction of the Irish was to use devices which had not been applied on a comparable scale in other societiescontinuous emigration, raising the age of marriage and reducing the proportion of people who did marry.
In other countries, the decline in fertility had come about not so much because the level of living was high but because there were conflicts between levels and desires. France, he thought, was a very good case in point. France had the longest history of a declining birth rate; it was declining in many areas in the middle of the eighteenth century, and in the country as a whole by the end of that century. This decline took place in a society with limited horizons of overall opportunity but with quite wide differentials in horizons. For example, one could buy one's way into the nobility if one had the money to do so. In the eighteenth century books were published listing the dowries which had to be given to daughters if their parents wanted them to marry an officer ofthe court, a surgeon or physician or someone of that standing. There were various forms of social advantages which could be obtained and these possibilities may have persuaded couples to control the size oftheir families. The nobility in France living around the court of Versailles, which must have had an extremely high level of conspicuous consumption, certainly reduced their fertility; the (upper crust' among them reduced it by 500 from the seventeenth to the first half of the eighteenth century. There is no simple correlation between the level of development and the onset of the demographic transition.
